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The Consequences of Conceptualism
MARGARET JANE RADIN*
INTRODUCTION
For several decades, scholars in many disciplines have been busy
persuading us that we completely misunderstand the nature of words
and the world when we think that there are rigid, clear concepts
applicable to particular circumstances in a self-evident logical man-
ner. Richard Epstein, however, remains unpersuaded. About prop-
erty, at least, he is an unabashed conceptualist and formalist.
Epstein is a conceptualist because he thinks there is a concept of
property that, in fact, is the right one or the only one. He thinks, that
is, that there is a conception of property that is the concept of prop-
erty. He is also a formalist (in the sense in which that word is most
commonly used in jurisprudence) because he thinks the concept of
property can be applied formally, i.e., logically and mechanically, to
yield results that should be obvious to readers and legal decision-mak-
ers. Epstein's tacit acceptance of conceptualism and formalism goes a
long way toward explaining why he seems so blithely to believe that
the results many readers find breathtakingly wrong are just obvious to
rational people. In this comment I shall leave aside his formalism, or
mechanical jurisprudence, because I don't suppose I have anything
new to say about what's wrong with it. Instead, I shall observe a few
things about his conceptualism and its consequences.
I.
The conception of property that Epstein takes for granted, his
one-and-only concept of property, is never stated in detail. Perhaps he
thinks it is too obvious to require an explicit defense. It can be
inferred, however, that the concept consists of general principles-
exclusive possession, use, and disposition-and a list of specific rules
that delineate the exact extent or application of these principles; that
is, how these principles mechanically decide specific cases. Epstein
fails to give us this list of specific rules that delineate the concept of
property-the institution of property as it ought to be.
At some points Epstein seems to state or imply that property is
whatever it was at common law. This raises numerous unanswerable
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questions. The common law at exactly what date? Could it not be
that common law judges were wrong about a few things? Which
ones? At other points, particularly in the discussions at this Confer-
ence, Epstein argues that what I and other symposiasts recognized as
some Humean law of practical reason prepolitically determines what
property is. I In his book, Epstein identifies Lockean natural rights as
the source of the concept of property (ch. 2), and given his reliance
upon the common law, it seems he must have thought that the com-
mon law perfectly expressed them. But this Humean move at the
Conference makes the concept of property prepolitical in only a prag-
matic (Hume said "artificial") sense, not in a natural rights sense. In
fact, Epstein said that natural rights arguments-like the one in his
book, I suppose-are merely the kind of mythology that political the-
orists were forced to resort to in describing an efficient regime, in the
centuries before we learned enough about economics to speak pre-
cisely about these matters.
At any rate, whatever its basis or source, Epstein thinks the con-
cept of property-consisting of articulated detailed rules-is obvious;
and it isn't. None of the proposed sources of the concept (Lockean
natural rights, Humean prepolitical artifice, or for that matter, pure
law-and-economics utilitarianism) generates the rules Epstein takes
for granted as implicit in the concept of property. For example, con-
sider the following, taken from a passage arguing against inheritance
taxes:
The conception of property includes the exclusive rights of posses-
sion, use, and disposition. The right of disposition includes dispo-
sitions during life, by gift or by sale, and it includes dispositions at
death, which are limited only by the status claims of family mem-
bers protected, for example, by rules relating to dower and forced
shares. (P. 304).
Does the concept of property really include all dispositions by sale?
The common law recognized a good many inalienabilities.3 Does the
1. Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 49, 176-78 (1986) [hereinafter Proceedings, supra p. _J.. See D. HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE pt. II, §§ 1-4 (Selby-Bigge 1978) (1740).
2. Proceedings, supra p. 126-27.
3. For example, the restraints imposed by the tenancy by the entireties, or, for that
matter, by the fee tail. Epstein elsewhere takes an ambivalent attitude toward inalienabilities.
It seems from his Columbia article, Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
970 (1985), that no deviations from free-market alienability are permitted unless they are
required by efficiency; whereas it seems from his most recent pronouncement that any
restraints are fine as long as imposed by individuals and not the government. Epstein, Past and
Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. - (1986). For a
diagnosis of the tension in his arguments, see Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64
WASH. U.L.Q. - (1986).
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concept of property really include disposition by will? Then we must
at least suppose the common law did not work out the concept of
property until the Statute of Wills. Why do rules relating, for exam-
ple, to dower and forced shares limit disposition by will? Forced
shares was a 19th century statutory reform prompted by the inequities
of the common law when it came to marital property. (Why isn't this
reform a taking?) If a particular version of "dower" is part of the
concept of property, then is "curtesy" also included?4 And what por-
tions of the common law of intestacy are part of the concept of prop-
erty? (Is primogeniture?) Is the whole common law system of future
interests part of the concept of property? If so, do we begin before or
after the Statute of Uses? Is the common law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities part of the concept of property? (If it is, is the "wait-and-see"
rule a taking?) Epstein's conceptualism not only supposes a determi-
nateness the concept of property cannot have, it denies that the con-
cept has evolved over time, and that it is still evolving. That is,
Epstein denies not just the problem of vagueness, but also the reality
of change. His is a timeless conservative conceptualism.
Not only is property vague, and evolving; it is also essentially
contested. I don't suppose Epstein means to be ungracious in not tell-
ing us what the eternal, formal concept of property, which contains
all the rules necessary to solve all our problem cases, actually "is."
Rather, I imagine he supposes that all he has to do is refer to it
obliquely, and all its detail will become clear to the reader. He must
suppose, then, that we are monolithically socialized into one culture
of property. But this I find astonishing; not only because it is patently
not the case, but also because it is quite contrary to the ideology of
liberalism to suppose that it should be so. As liberals, we pride our-
selves on being pluralist about these things of fundamental political
and moral significance. Property is, and probably always will be, a
contested concept. While this doesn't mean, necessarily, that there is
no "best" conception, it certainly means that that conception has to
be argued for.
II.
"The idea of property embraces the absolute right to exclude" (p.
65). Perhaps the most serious consequence of Epstein's timeless con-
servative conceptualism is a disquieting inference about discrimina-
tion. The common law did not preclude discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, religion, or national origin. Are discrimination rights
4. See C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 664-70 (2d ed. 1983).
1986]
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part of the exclusion rights inherent in the concept of property? Is the
Civil Rights Act' a taking?
In his book, Epstein does not face up to this disquieting infer-
ence. Would he say that the Civil Rights Act is prima facie a taking,
but saved somehow either by implicit in-kind compensation or reli-
ance? Unlike social security and welfare, which he deems saved by
reliance (p. 325-27), the Civil Rights Act has not been around for very
long. And it is hard to argue that bigots are "really" benefited when
they are forced to accept those they seek to exclude. At the very least,
it would be hard for Epstein to argue this while also remaining an
advocate of the Hobbesian rent seeking model of politics.6
The crucial point is that there is no room in Epstein's theory to
admit that certain things formerly called property rights-such as the
right to discriminate and the right to own human beings-were
wrongly so designated, and wrongly held as against the personhood of
others. Under Epstein's theory, it seems we must consider the cancel-
lation of these "rights" to be a taking. If Epstein were to admit that
some things have been (and still are?) wrongly thought of as property,
his theory would need a great deal of amendment; for some things
wrongly called property should not be treated as property interests
requiring compensation of those who held them wrongly. That is, if
exclusion rights against nonwhites were formerly considered to be
part of the bundle of rights called property, they were wrongly so
considered; and to correct this wrong against human personhood is
not a taking.
Epstein deplores positivism because it seems to make property
rights too mutable: what the government giveth, the government
taketh away. Yet he flirts with the pitfalls of positivism to the extent
he embraces a utilitarian approach to solving property problems.
Bentham, of course, met the problem head-on and declared: "Prop-
erty and law are born together, and die together."' 7 The "public
choice" (rent seeking) model of politics coheres most readily with the
positivist, consequentialist model of property.8 It can be gathered
from Epstein's remarks at the Conference that he thinks the Humean
5. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
6. Proceedings, supra p. 187-97.
7. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (R. Hildreth trans. ed. 1911) (2d ed.
n.d.).
8. In Time, Possession, and Alienation, I argue against Epstein's contention that he can
coherently be a libertarian rights theorist and a utilitarian consequentialist at the same time.
Radin, supra note 3.
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move9 can give him both nonpositivist immutability and positivist effi-
ciency. That, of course, is open to much dispute;"° but it is a topic for
another book because he did not raise it in this one.
Epstein's timeless conservative conceptualism is not the only
alternative to positivism. I agree with Epstein that to treat property
rights as mutable at the whim of the government does, sometimes, fail
to respect persons and their liberty or autonomy. But I think one
could better respect the deep moral significance of some property by
becoming a progressive naturalist. A progressive naturalist would say
that there is a best conception of property, but we haven't yet reached
it. The history of changing property notions is describable as a his-
tory of rejecting bad parts of the institution and substituting better
ones-a process that can continue indefinitely. This view would allow
us to suppose we have reached a point in history when we can recog-
nize that exclusionary rights countenancing discrimination on the
basis of race, etc., are wrong, and have always been wrong. In my
view, this would be more satisfactory than a positivist, consequential-
ist justification of the Civil Rights Act (anti-discrimination laws pres-
ently serve efficiency, or whatever), or Richard Epstein's, if he has
one.
III.
Allied to Epstein's conceptualism is his rigidity about what the
label "property" confers. For him, property is an all-or-nothing con-
cept; there are no gradations. If something is property, a full panoply
of moral force and legal protection attaches to it. Property is prop-
erty is property. Homes and wedding rings are no different from
machine tools and parking lots.
Apparently Epstein does recognize gradations in the category of
free speech, for he says that "it is better . . . to create responsible
subcategories and rebuttable presumptions than it is to pretend that
all speech is of equal importance, when it evidently is not" (p. 138).
In my view, it is equally evident that not all property is of equal
importance. This requires creating "responsible subcategories" in
property as well. Once, Epstein alludes to this notion by mentioning
the categories of "commercial" and "personal" property in such a
9. Timeless, changeless, and prepolitical practical consequences determine what property
"is."
10. It seems entirely implausible that human nature and human society are so essentially
fixed in the 18th century market models that they have always and will forever practically
arrive at private property and free contract, much less specific detailed institutional
manifestations of them.
19861
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way as to suggest that "personal" property requires higher compensa-
tion when the government takes it (p. 174). Yet he seems quite una-
ware of the sweeping implication of such a distinction, and it is absent
from the rest of his book.
Such subcategories have been part of the discourse about prop-
erty for a long time, perhaps since Karl MarxII distinguished between
use value and exchange value, and at least since Morris Cohen' 2 dis-
tinguished between property for use and property for power. Just as
speech directly related to political struggle seems closer to the inter-
ests the first amendment clearly recognizes and protects, so only a
subcategory of everything we think of as property seems directly con-
nected to the interest in personal autonomy and self-development that
forms the core of the ideology of property. Property that is personal
in the sense of being justifiably bound up with the self and its individ-
uality deserves, and in our system often receives, a higher level of
respect and protection than property that is not.'"
Fungible property-that which is held merely for investment or
exchange and is not justifiably bound up with the person-is fully
interchangeable with its market value in money, while personal prop-
erty is not. This has many ramifications for a theory of eminent
domain which are as yet unexplored. For example: Is there some
personal property that government may not take at all? Is there some
personal property that can be taken, but only if compensation is
greater than the market price? Is there some fungible property that
can be taken without compensation, either because doing so is
equivalent to taxation, or because the property impinges on more
important personal interests of others? Just as Epstein's brand of con-
ceptualism prevents him from adequately dealing with the problem
that certain traditional property rules have been wrong, so it also pre-
vents him from seeing more than very dimly that property is neither
morally nor legally monolithic.
I1. K. MARX, CAPITAL 41-81 (F. Engels ed. 1906).
12. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). The distinction was
earlier proposed by the British sociologist L.T. Hobhouse in The Historical Evolution of
Property, in Fact and in Idea, in PROPERTY: ITS DUTIES AND RIGHTS 3 (2d ed. 1922).
13. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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